Many directors are not simply insiders or outsiders. For example, an officer of a supplier firm is neither independent nor captive of management. We use a spatial model of board decision-making to analyze bargaining among multiple types of directors. Board decisions are modeled using a new bargaining solution concept called consensus. We use consensus to develop the idea that the information a new director brings to a large board is more important than the new director's impact on bargaining, provided existing preferences on the board are not too diverse. Our model suggests broadening the regulatory definition of independence of directors and requiring a supermajority of outsiders. The analysis also shows that strong penalties such as those imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley tend to erode incentives given that board performance is difficult to measure.
Introduction
Discussions of corporate boards often focus on insiders and outsiders. However, this classification has been less than successful empirically, and many questions of interest consider diverse directors. For example, what is the impact of a "gray" director who has a business relationship with the firm but is neither an insider aligned with management nor a disinterested outsider? How effective are directors who are independent but have their own agendas and disagree with each other? The purpose of this paper is to find a framework in which we can analyze decisions in diverse corporate boards. By diverse we mean that directors' preferences may differ over several dimensions, which we believe to be true to a greater or lesser extent for all boards. We use this framework, including our equilibrium notion called consensus, to analyze policy questions and to make testable predictions.
1 Our analysis suggests that existing regulatory definitions of what is an outside director should be broadened and that firms should be required to have a super-majority of outside directors. Our model also predicts that boards will perform better if they include some gray directors who have some conflict of interest but also bring some information to the board, especially if the board has a super-majority of outsiders whose preferences are not too diverse.
To accommodate directors with diverse preferences, the board in our model makes a decision over multidimensional actions. Directors may disagree in different ways about different actions, which allows us to differentiate disagreements between insiders and outsiders, among outsiders, and between gray directors and either insiders or outsiders. We keep the model tractable by assuming that each director's utility is decreasing in distance from the director's most preferred action (ideal). This assumption allows us to use geometry to analyze the solution. The board choice is modeled by a new solution concept called consensus, discussed in more detail later. This concept is good for describing decisions made through discussion and bargaining subject to majority vote in the event of disagreement. We take a simple view on information, assuming that each director has an endowment of information that is shared with the rest of the board (as is the director's incentive in our examples). The simple form of information allows us to analyze trade-offs between information and preferences in spite of the richness of the set of possible actions.
Our model of board decision-making can be used to address a number of policy questions. For example, there has been a lot of attention recently to populating a board with a majority of independent directors. However, a conflicted director may be better than a strictly independent director if the conflicted director also brings information to the board. For example, an officer of a major supplier may bring useful information that is more important than the marginal impact on voting. Our model shows that a conflicted director is more valuable for the firm when the director's conflict differs from that of the insiders, and is most valuable when the conflict is opposing.
Our model also shows that a simple majority of outsiders may be unable to have a significant impact on the board's decisions. A minority with concentrated preferences may prevail over a majority with conflicting interests, since the directors in the majority might spend much of their persuasive effort fighting each other. And, if insiders can dictate the agenda or more generally have higher bargaining weights than the outsiders, they may be able to obtain their preferred outcome even if in the minority in numbers.
Another policy question relates to the stiffening of penalties for deviations from measured value-maximization as seems to be the intent of parts of Sarbanes-Oxley. The ability to improve matters using such a penalty depends a lot on being able to measure board performance ex post. We show that if only part of performance can be measured, directors facing the penalty will be driven to optimize the measurable part and neglect the rest as in Holmström and Milgrom (1991) . Thus strict penalties are undesirable given that performance measures are very noisy and directors already have some commonality of interest with shareholders. For example, given that managers have to represent, under threat of felony conviction, that accounting statements give an accurate picture of firm value, firms tend to forgo projects that are profitable and socially desirable but are difficult to evaluate.
Our model offers a number of testable empirical implications. It suggests that adding new directors has a larger impact on performance when the board is small and diverse. Gray directors who have valuable information such as industry knowledge are beneficial for large boards, boards dominated by outsiders, and boards that are not too diverse, while adding a gray director to a small board may be costly. Our model also implies that defining a board as independent when it has a supermajority (as opposed to simple majority) of independent directors should improve the significance of the relationship between board independence and firm performance.
A major innovation in the paper is the introduction of a new equilibrium concept, consensus, which is used to model decisions of the board. Corporate boards make many decisions through discussion and bargaining rather than formal voting. The existing approaches to analyzing bargaining, however, seem inappropriate for modelling a corporate board. The most popular cooperative solution concept, the Nash bargaining solution, is predicated on the notion that each party to the negotiation has veto power. On a board, however, the threat of a vote limits the influence of individual directors, especially if their views are much different from those of the rest of the board. For example, a majority with identical preferences and control of the agenda should be able to dictate the outcome regardless of the preferences of the other directors. That is our motivation for introducing a new bargaining solution, consensus (which has this property), rather than using the Nash bargaining solution (which does not).
Formally, the consensus sets to zero a weighted sum of the directors' normalized marginal utility vectors. We model directors' preferences using a spatial model in which a director's utility from an action (or decision on all issues) depends on the distance from the action to the director's possibly random ideal action choice. A similar approach to specifying preferences is used, for example, in the political model of Baron (1991) and in models of product differentiation such as Hotelling (1929) . More specifically, we assume that utility is a negative expected squared distance from the director's ideal, and thus the agent has concentric indifference curves. If the ideal is random, we refer to the director's expectation of the ideal as the director's target. With these preferences, the consensus minimizes a sum of bargaining weights times distances (not squared distances 2 ) from the directors' targets.
2 Minimizing squared distances would not respect majority rule.
The consensus defined in this paper has a number of attractive properties. It is always Pareto optimal (among the directors, who are not permitted to make side payments) because distance is a monotone decreasing function of utility, and thus the weighted sum of distances is a social welfare function for the directors. If a majority (by weights) of directors has the same target, the consensus is that target, which is sensible because a majority should be able to vote in their preferred action. If all directors' targets are collinear, then there is a natural ordering of the directors, and the consensus is the target of the (weighted) median director, a result similar to the median voter theorem.
Importantly, the consensus handles reasonably a director with extreme preferences, meaning a director with a target far from the cluster of all the other directors' targets. Such a director cannot enforce a large deviation from what the other directors want but does have some influence. Specifically, in this model, moving an existing director's target along the ray that connects the consensus with the director's original target does not change the consensus: what matters is the direction the board member pulls in (the direction of the ray), not how far the board member wants to pull (the intensity of preferences). Intuitively, such a director will spend all available political influence 3 on moving in the direction of the target, which has the same effect whether the target is nearer or farther away. A moderate environmentalist on the board may convince profit-oriented board members to go along with more recycling. However, an extreme environmentalist will be able to do no more and will not have the votes needed to shut down the firm's factories and convert the properties to parks. The limited influence of extreme directors is consistent with vote-trading and Baron's (1991) argument how even a small political party with extreme preferences can obtain some influence.
This paper is complementary to existing theoretical work on boards. We have excluded features such as costly effort, delegation, and incentives for sharing information, all of which are studied in the interesting papers by Harris and 3 We think of the exogeneity of the amount of available influence as being related to the assumption of no side payments. If side payments were available, directors could buy influence and intensity of preferences would matter, as they would if director effort affected bargaining efficacy. On the other side, an extreme director with intense preferences might be marginalized completely due to a pariah effect. Our intermediate assumption is probably reasonable for most boards. Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) . Another interesting theoretical paper is Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , which looks at CEO retention, the effect of negotiations between the CEO and the board on CEO salary and percentage of insiders on the board, 4 and the incentive for costly information-gathering by directors. In all three papers, director preferences are one-dimensional: Harris and Raviv have two types, and Hermalin and Weisbach and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) have preferences determined by one parameter. We do not model the adverse selection and moral hazard features that are the focus of these other papers, but we do allow a rich diversity of director preferences that allow us to answer questions not addressed in the other papers.
Raviv (2004) and
5 Our analysis is also significantly different from the analysis of Gomes and Novaes (2005) , who compare monitoring by a large shareholder with adding the large shareholder to the board. We do have one theme in common with their paper, which is that the usefulness of adding a conflicted director depends on whether the new director's conflict reinforces or neutralizes the conflict of insiders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of board decision-making using consensus. Section 3 considers some examples that address policy questions such as the trade-off between independence and information and the desirability of imposing stronger penalties, such as those in Sarbanes-Oxley, for not acting to maximize firm value. Section 4 discusses empirical implications of our model. Section 5 shows a number of properties of consensus, and serves to justify this decision rule. Section 5 also provides tools that are used to construct the examples in Section 3. Section 6 closes the paper.
4 Recent regulatory changes are intended to give CEO's less influence on the selection of directors but it is an open empirical question how effective these changes will be. If the changes are effective, the model of Hermalin and Weisbach may be less relevant in future than it was in the past.
5 Our paper seems less related to Cai (2005) and the theoretical part of Aggarwal and Nanda (2004) . These papers focus on costly effort, by a team of directors collecting information in the case of Cai (2005) and by the manager who is contracted separately by each director in the case of Aggarwal and Nanda (2004) . Another relatively unrelated paper is Song and Thakor (forthcoming), which analyses how career concerns affect information sharing between the CEO and the board and the CEO's preferences over board composition.
Board Decision-Making
The board's task is to choose an action a ∈ ℜ M . The board consists of N directors. Each director n's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is a negative squared deviation from the director's possibly random ideal action y n :
The ideal y n may depend on stock and output market conditions, firm and individual characteristics, and may not be fully known to the director at the time the board chooses an action. Each director n possesses information I n . All our examples assume that the I n 's are identical and represent the pooled information of all the board members. However, the definition of consensus is more general and does not require this restriction. There is no costly information gathering (which is interesting but not our focus, see Harris and Raviv (2004) ). It is useful to restate the director's preferences in terms of what the director knows (which may not include y n ). We first decompose the ideal as y n = t n + (y n − t n ), where
is the target and (y n − t n ) is the forecast error. Then, we can express the utility (1) as
where the first term is the negative conditional variance of the forecast error and the second term is the squared deviation of the action from the target. Because the conditional variance of the forecast error does not depend on the action a, the director's preferences over actions depend only on the final term −(t n − a)
Given a collection of N directors, we need to have a model of what action the board will select. We wish the action choice to be consistent with recourse to majority voting for resolving any disagreements, and therefore a director with extreme preferences (a target far from the other directors' targets) should have a limited influence on the board's decisions because any proposal to accommodate significantly the extreme director would get voted down. For generality, we allow directors to have different bargaining weights b n ; usually, we assume that all directors have the same bargaining power: b n = 1 for all n. We model the directors' decision using the following definition of consensus (which, as we show later, has the desired properties):
Definition 1. Given targets t n and bargaining weights b n , action a is a consensus if and only if there exist z n such that
where each z n ∈ e n (a), and
for all n. Intuitively, each director n pulls in the direction of the director's ideal (which is also the direction of steepest increase in the utility function) with an intensity of b n . If the action coincides with the director's ideal, the director pulls with an intensity of up to b n in whatever direction is needed to stay at the ideal. The bargaining power b n describes the director's relative influence on the board's decision. For example, directors who control the agenda, represent large investors or have better negotiation skills may have more influence on board decisions. Notice that the definition implies that doubling the bargaining power of an agent has the same impact on the consensus as adding another director with the same preferences.
If the action space ℜ M is the plane ℜ 2 , a physical interpretation may be useful. Think of the action space as the frictionless surface of a table, with weight b n for director n suspended by a sufficiently long weightless wire at the director's target. The wires extend around pulleys to a common knot on the surface of the table; the equilibrium location of the physical knot is the consensus of our model.
The following theorem offers a useful alternative characterization of the consensus.
6 Throughout, denotes the Euclidean distance:
Theorem 1. (characterization) Suppose that directors have concentric preferences given by (1) with fixed information I n , and are therefore characterized by their targets (2). Then, an action a * is a consensus (according to Definition 1) if and only if the action solves
Proof. Given preferences (1), Definition 1 of consensus is the first-order condition for the convex but not-everywhere-differentiable minimization (6). The detailed proof is in the Appendix.
In our spatial model, the characterization in Theorem 1 could be used as a definition of consensus. Definition 1, however, is easier to generalize to other utility functions (by replacing t n − a with the gradient of the utility function 7 ). Theorem 1 also suggests an alternative definition that would minimize b n t n − a 2 (equivalent to maximizing a weighted sum of utilities). Although analytically easier to solve, this definition gives unreasonably large power to directors with extreme preferences and is not consistent with a fallback to majority rule.
Consensus, as defined in Definition 1 and characterized in Theorem 1, is a simple reduced-form that is intended to have qualitative features that might be found in a more elaborate model with such complex features as agendasetting and vote-trading. The following desirable properties of consensus are quantified and proven in Section 5:
1. Consensus always exists. 2. Consensus is unique if the targets are not collinear. 7 Let u n be a concave and differentiable expected utility of director n with fixed information I n : u n (a) = E[U n (a, y n )|I n ], and let u ′ n (a) denote a derivative of u n (a). Then, action a is a consensus if and only if there exist z n ∈ e n (a) that satisfy (4), where
3. Consensus is Pareto optimal. 4. When the targets are collinear, consensus is the target of the weighted median voter. 5. If there is a majority by weights with the same preferences, the consensus is the majority's target. 6. A director with extreme preferences has little or no influence on the consensus.
These results are the justification of the assertion that consensus is consistent with a fallback to majority rule.
Board Composition and Action Choice 3.1 Directors with Extreme Preferences
Our first example illustrates two different ways adding a director can impact the board's decision. First, the new director brings information that can be used by all directors. Second, the director's preferences have an impact that depends on the director's bargaining power. Whether adding a director is an improvement from the perspective of the existing directors depends on the tradeoff of these two effects. Whether shareholders are better off is considered in the following subsection in a rich example with inside, independent, and grey directors.
This example also illustrates that when the new director's preferences are extreme, the director's bargaining power has little or no influence on the consensus. We have in mind the intuition that a director with extreme preferences has only one vote and any proposal to accommodate the extreme preferences would get voted down. This director, however, may have some influence by trading votes with more influential directors, in line with Baron's (1991) argument why a small political party may have some influence in a parliamentary system dominated by two large parties.
Example 1. (Information vs. Private Interests) Consider a board with N = N 0 > 2 directors with ideals located on a circle with radius r > 0 in ℜ 3 :
where λ ∼ N (1, σ 2 λ ) andȳ is a constant vector with the first coordinateȳ 1 = 0. We assume that these initial N 0 directors have no knowledge of λ and have the same bargaining power b n = 1.
Suppose another director N 0 + 1 with bargaining power b N 0 +1 joins the board. We assume this director knows λ, and the new director's preferences diverge, perhaps significantly, from the preferences of the other directors. The new director is assumed to have the ideal
where the idiosyncracy h > 0. The new director is assumed to share the knowledge of λ with the other directors (indeed in this example the director will want to share the information becauseȳ 1 = 0 implies that the new information is orthogonal to the disagreement between the new and the original directors). 
The coordinates of all actions are (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ). The arrows show the force with which each director "pulls" the action towards the director's ideal. The consensus balances these forces. each original director (n ≤ N 0 ) will have the target
and the new director's target is
=ȳλ + (h, 0, 0).
Lemma 1. (Extreme Director)
In Example 1, for the initial set of N 0 directors, the consensus is located at the center of the circle of their targets:
while the consensus with the new director is
Proof. See the Appendix.
The change in the consensus when the new director joins comes from two sources: the influence of the new director's information and the influence of the new director's preferences. From Lemma 1, adding the new director rescales the consensus by λ (from a * 0 =ȳ to a * 1 ≡ȳλ due to the new director's information) and translates the consensus by h 0 in the direction of the new director's target (from a * 1 =ȳλ to a * =ȳλ + (h 0 , 0, 0)) due to the new director's bargaining power.
When the new director's preferences are extreme (h is large), the impact of the new director's bargaining power h 0 is independent of h (because this implies the second case in (16)). Having more extreme preferences does not change the direction or the intensity of the new director's pull in the bargaining process. In this case, h 0 is small when the new director's bargaining power b N 0 +1 is small, the number of original directors N 0 is large, and if the dispersion r of the original directors is small. If the original directors are relatively disperse they are less effective because they tend to fight among themselves instead of resisting the new director.
Lemma 2. (Information vs. Private Interests) In Example 1, after the new director joins, the original directors' utilities change by
Proof. From (1), the utility of an original director n ≤ N 0 in the initial consensus is
and the utility of the original director n after the new director N 0 + 1 joins is
The change in original directors' utilities when the new director joins comes from two sources: the influence of the new director's information and the influence of the new director's preferences. The term ȳ 2 σ 2 λ (the expected squared distance from a * 0 to a * 1 ) is the increase in the original director's utility due to the new information; and h 2 0 (the squared distance from a * 1 to a * ) is the reduction of the original director's utility due to the new director's bargaining power.
Director Independence
Conflicts of interest may arise when directors have ties (beyond board membership) to managers they are meant to supervise. This seems to imply that director independence is crucial for board effectiveness and suggests that regulations encouraging board independence may be beneficial. In this subsection, we use our model to explore issues of director independence. We find that the current definition of director independence may be too restrictive. Perhaps the definition of independence should encompass conflicted directors who bring information, provided that their conflict is different from that of other insiders. We also find that having a strict majority of independent directors may not be good enough given that insiders' interests are more focused. Perhaps firms should be encouraged to have a supermajority of independent directors.
In the United States, regulation of the composition of corporate boards has been largely delegated to Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) 10 such as the NYSE and NASD. Both of these organizations have recently adopted rules requiring a majority of the board to be composed of independent directors. According to NASD rule 4350(c),
11
A majority of the board of directors must be comprised of independent directors as defined in Rule 4200.
The definition of independence excludes employees, high-paid consultants, close relatives of executives, and significantly for our purposes executives of a significant customer or supplier. Specifically, NASD rule 4200-1(a)(14)(C) says a person satisfying the following description should not be considered independent:
a director who is a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, any for-profit business organization to which the corporation made, or from which the corporation received, payments (other than those arising solely from investments in the corporation's securities) that exceed 5% of the corporation's or business organization's consolidated gross revenues for that year, or $200,000, whichever is more, in any of the past three years.
The NYSE has a similar rule. According to NYSE rule 303A.01,
12
Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors. According to NYSE rule 303A.02(b)(v), the director is not considered independent if the director is a current employee, or an immediate family member is a current executive officer, of a company that has made payments to, or received payments from, the listed company for property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three fiscal years, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other company's consolidated gross revenues.
The following example illustrates why it might be preferable to add a new director who would fail the current test of independence. It also illustrates that having a majority of independent directors may not be good enough.
Example 2. There is a vacancy on a board, and we want to consider the choice between two candidates. The first candidate C 1 is a strictly independent director who wants to maximize firm value but brings no information. The second candidate C 2 is somewhat conflicted but also brings some information to the board. For example, the second candidate may be part owner and an executive of a major supplier.
The action space is ℜ 5 ; having five actions allows us to separate the dispersion of the original directors, the insiders' conflict, the conflict with the new candidates, and the impact of the new information. The firm value maximizing action is The first candidate new director C 1 is strictly independent, which we interpret as wanting to maximize profits. Therefore, C 1 has ideal
The second candidate director C 2 is somewhat conflicted, but also brings knowledge of λ to the board. The candidate C 2 has ideal
with both g 1 = 0 and g 2 = 0. All directors (including both candidates) have the same bargaining power b n = 1.
In this example, because insiders collude (have the same ideal) while independent directors have dispersed ideals, the consensus action may coincide with the insiders' target even if there is a majority by weights of independent directors. Calculations similar to those in Lemma 1 imply that the consensus action without any new candidate is
which coincides with the insiders' target when h 0 = δ. The effect of the new director on the consensus generally depends on the coordinates g 1 and g 2 of the new director's target. The following lemma however, offers sufficient conditions on existing directors' preferences for all candidate new directors, possessing whatever g 1 and g 2 , to be ineffective in keeping the insiders from their optimum.
Lemma 3. (Ineffective Majority of Independent Directors) Adding any new director, including the strictly independent candidate C 1 or a conflicted candidate C 2 with any g 1 and g 2 , preserves the consensus at the insiders' target if
For any given board composition N o and N i , the above inequality is satisfied when the disagreement among independent directors r is large enough compared to their disagreement with the insiders δ.
The intuition from Example 1 suggests that adding the conflicted but informed candidate C 2 results in a higher firm value than adding a strictly independent candidate C 1 if the reduction in the uncertainty from the new information compensates for the bias in the action choice. Because it is difficult to find a closed-form expression for the consensus with the new candidate C 2 , we illustrate this intuition using numerical solution with the following parameter values: N o = 4, N i = 3, δ = 1, and r = 0.3.
For any new director of type C 2 , the third and the fourth coordinates of the consensus action are zero and the fifth coordinate is λ. Figure 2 shows the projection of our solution on the first two coordinates. The projection of all possible consensus actions with the new candidate is the area bounded by A candidate informed director whose conflict is closely aligned with insiders (as it is on the right in this figure) requires a larger amount of information σ λ 2 to be a good addition to the board than a director who is unconflicted or has a conflict opposing the insiders (on the left). the dotted line. Each solid line shows the locus of the new director's targets that result in the consensus actions with the same distance from the value maximizing action (0, 0, 0, 0, λ). If the new director's target is located in the cone formed by rays r 1 and r 2 , then the consensus coincides with the insider's target.
For each locus, there is a threshold value of σ 2 λ (indicated on the graph), above which adding the new informed director with a target on the locus results in a higher firm value than adding the strictly independent candidate C 1 . The figure shows that the firm owners may prefer to add a director with a significant conflict of interest (large g 2 1 + g 2 2 ) and little new information (small σ 2 λ ) if the director's conflict of interest differs from that of the existing insiders (g 2 may be large, but g 1 is positive and small or negative).
We have seen that insiders acting on behalf of the CEO may get what they want in spite of a majority of outsiders. In the model, that can happen because the outsiders have diverse interests centered around but far from the optimum (when r is larger) or when insiders have larger bargaining weights (perhaps as a result of agenda-setting power). In practice, a minority of insiders could maintain control for other reasons not in the model. For example, insiders seem likely to have better attendance at meetings and could have a majority of a quorum at most meetings but a minority of the whole board. Or, an outside director may be a CEO or ex-CEO who thinks of board meddling as intrusive and counterproductive. Such an outsider would side with management and would also tend to select like-minded candidates when serving on a nominating committee.
Fiduciary Duties
Incentives or penalties for deviations from the value-maximizing actions can be used to mitigate the conflicts of interests that influence board's actions. Stronger incentives seem desirable when directors face more conflicts of interests. Strict penalties, however, may backfire because it is difficult to measure performance ex-post. Our results illustrate how penalties, such as those imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley, may be counter-productive.
The current legal system imposes fiduciary duties (duties of diligence, loyalty, and obedience) on directors. Directors are generally protected by the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule, as stated by the Delaware courts, is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Stricter standards are applied when apparent conflicts of interest are present. According to Knepper and Bailey (2004) , When a challenger of the business judgment rule has shown that directors have a self-interest in the transaction at issue -that is, that the corporate fiduciaries, because of a conflict are disabled from safeguarding the interests of the shareholders to whom they owe a duty -the burden of proof shifts to the directors.
For similar reasons, inside directors may also be subject to more scrutiny:
Under numerous statutory theories of liability, an "inside" director faces greater liability exposure than a disinterested "outside" director".
The extent to which the courts impose fiduciary duties is limited; courts generally do not "second-guess the directors' choice of procedure absent gross negligence" (Knepper and Bailey (2004) ). In the recent years, however, the penalties for corporate wrongdoing have increased, primarily due to Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
13 Sarbanes-Oxley also prohibits certain actions that are deemed to create conflicts of interest such as loans to directors and officers. We want to model penalties for deviating from the value-maximizing action. The penalty can arise from various sources such as compensation, requirements imposed by SROs, governmental regulation and law enforcement. It would be unreasonable to assume a forcing contract that penalizes deviations from the optimum because the optimum probably depends on information available to the directors but unavailable to the party imposing the penalty, even ex-post. Instead, suppose that directors' preferences have two parts: deviation from the ideal action y n and a penalty for deviation from some possibly random action a 0n ,
where β n > −1, or else there is not a unique a that maximizes (18). Action a 0n may depend only on the information available to the party that imposes the penalty. Because the penalty is applied after the board decision-making is over, a 0n may in particular depend on some information unavailable to directors during the decision making process. In that case, director n views a 0n as random when determining the target action. From (18),
Note that only the last term depends on the chosen action a. Therefore, given preferences with the penalty in (18), the target is
and cardinal preferences are an affine transform of what they were in (3) so that ordinal preferences 14 are the same as they were in (3), so we use the same definition of consensus as before (using t n 's in (20)).
Lemma 4. Consider a board of N directors in which directors 1, 2, ..., N 0 have the same ideal y n = y and the same information I n = I, and consequently the same target before penalty t = E[y|I]. Suppose these directors face the same penalty β(a 0 − a) ′ (a 0 − a) and have more bargaining power than the rest of the board: Proof. Because directors n ≤ N 0 have the majority of the bargaining power and identical targets, the consensus is their common target from (20), i.e. a * = (t + βE[a 0 |I])/(1 + β). Therefore, the expected squared deviation of a * from a f v can be rewritten as
Consider the last expression. The first term is minimized at 0 when (21) is satisfied and the second term is (22). If β and a 0 satisfy (21) and minimize (22), both terms are minimized and therefore the sum is minimized. Conversely, we want to show that if β and a 0 do not satisfy (21) or do not minimize (22), then the sum of both terms is not minimized.
Suppose β and a 0 do not satisfy (21). If β = 0, then adding a constant to a 0 to satisfy (21) reduces the first term and does not affect the second term, showing that β and a 0 did not minimize the sum. If β = 0, then changing β to any nonzero value and adding a constant to a 0 to satisfy (21) reduces the first term to zero. The resulting change in the second term can be made arbitrarily small by setting β to a small enough value. Therefore, small enough β and corresponding a 0 to satisfy (21) must reduce the overall sum, showing that the original values did not minimize the sum.
If β and a 0 do not minimize (22), then changing β to some nonzero 15 value that reduces the second term and adding a constant to a 0 to satisfy (21) reduces the second term and does not increase the first term, showing that β and a 0 did not minimize the sum.
Notice that, for any β = 0 (which is without loss of generality as noted in the proof), E[a 0 ] can be set to (E[a f v ](1+β)−E[t])/β to satisfy (21). Therefore, the strength of penalty β and the random part of the target E[a 0 |I] − E[a 0 ] can be chosen to minimize (22) . Minimizing the variance (22) is like a linear regression. Given β > −1, β = 0, the choice of a 0 gets rid of the volatility in the a f v and t terms that can be spanned by the information available in E[a 0 |I] for different choices of a 0 . The determination of β therefore is related to the parts of a f v and t that cannot be spanned. If, for example, the parts of a f v and t that cannot be spanned are negatively correlated, minimization of the variance would want to pick 1/(1 + β) to be negative, which is infeasible. In this case, there is a closure problem and the optimal value would be approached in the limit as β ↑ ∞: since it is infeasible to use t to hedge the risk in a f v , the best that can be done is to "kill off" the term in t by making the denominator large.
Lemma 4 assumes that the penalty can be implemented at no cost. In reality, imposing small penalties and fines can be considered costless or even beneficial for the rest of the society, but more serious punishments such as imprisonment are fairly costly. The penalty may also impose an indirect cost on the firm, because it reduces directors' utility and, in the absence of rents, would lead directors to require higher compensation for their services.
Implementing the penalty suggested in Lemma 4 may be difficult, since it requires an ability to identify what actions would increase the firm value. Indeed, the empirical studies that analyze the link between various board characteristics and firm value typically rely on such obviously flawed measures of board performance as Tobin's Q, the "universal proxy" (see, for example, Yermack (1996) ). As shown in Holmström and Milgrom (1991) , when there is a lot of uncertainty about what maximizes the firm value, any incentive scheme is likely to cause undesirable biases in the agents' choices.
Empirical Implications
Our model's most interesting implications are normative. However, the model also offers testable hypotheses. From Example 1, we can obtain the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Adding a new director has a larger impact when the board is diverse.
This implication arises as a direct consequence of Lemma 1, which shows that the new director has a larger effect on consensus when the existing directors have diverse targets.
Lemma 2 offers implications for the observed choices of new directors if the choices are made by the existing directors by majority rule (the choice will be different if the decision is made by the management or the shareholders).
Hypothesis 2. If new directors are chosen by the existing directors, the existing directors are likely to choose the candidate who is well informed and has similar interests. Moreover, the existing directors are more likely to add a new director when the existing directors' interests are less diverse.
Hypothesis 2 follows from the result in Lemma 2 which shows that the impact of the new director on the existing directors' utilities is more positive when the new director is well informed and has a target that is close to the existing directors' targets.
The following four hypotheses follow from Example 2.
Hypothesis 3. Outside directors are less effective when their interests are diverse.
Hypothesis 4. Defining the board as independent when it has a supermajority of independent directors (as opposed to simple majority) should improve the significance of the relationship between board independence and firm performance.
Hypothesis 5. Adding an informed but conflicted (gray) director whose conflict opposes that of the insiders is more beneficial than adding and independent uninformed director or adding an informed director whose conflict is closely aligned with insiders.
Hypothesis 6. The impact of adding an independent director with little valuable information is zero in boards with small numbers of outsiders who are quite diverse.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 follow from equation (15), showing that the consensus on the original board (before new director is added) is closer to the insiders' target when outside directors are more diverse and may coincide with the insider's target even if there is a strict majority of outsiders when their targets are sufficiently diverse. Empirical studies often either classify boards as independent if the majority of the directors are independent (for example, Byrd and Hickman (1992) , Bhagat and Black (2000) ), or characterize boards by the percentage of independent directors (Mehran (1995) , Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) , Yermack (1996) ). Equation (15), however, shows that a supermajority of independent directors may be required to affect the board decisions when the insiders' conflicts are large and when the outsiders have diverse targets. Additionally, if the dispersion of directors' targets is smaller when some specific issues are concerned, Hypothesis 3 may help explain the more significant relationship between board independence and performance on specific issues such as CEO turnover (Weisbach (1988) , Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2000) ), merger and acquisition strategies (Shivdasani (1993) , Byrd and Hickman (1992) ), and executive compensation (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) ).
Hypothesis 5 is illustrated in Figure 2 that shows a tradeoff between the new director's information and the new director's conflict of interest. Hypothesis 6 is a consequence of Lemma 3, which shows that any new director, even a strictly independent one, would preserve the consensus at the insider's target when there are few independent directors with diverse targets.
Example 2 may also offer a potential explanation for the empirical observation that larger boards appear to be less effective (Yermack (1996) ). Including additional assumptions on board growth, Hypothesis 3 can be rephrased as follows.
Hypothesis 7. Large boards may be less effective if, as boards grow, the outsiders on the board become more diverse while insiders remain closely aligned with the management.
As boards grow, there may be more tendency to accept directors representing special interests and thus add diversity. Hypothesis 7 implies that including measures of diversity as controls may eliminate the negative relationship between board size and performance.
It should be noted that all our hypotheses treat board composition and addition of new directors as exogenous. In practice both are often endogenously determined together with other firm and managerial characteristics. As with most empirical analyses in corporate finance, developing an empirical framework that addresses the endogeneity issues properly may be difficult. Also, as in all settings in information economics, many variables of interest are not observable even ex post. Thus, empirical studies often have to rely on proxies whose theoretical and empirical validity has not been established. For example, board performance cannot be measured directly and it is not clear whether any useful proxy can be observed.
Properties of Consensus
Decision-making on a corporate board is a complex dynamic process that includes such institutions as formal votes, agenda-setting, coalition formation, and vote-trading. Like the Nash bargaining solution, our analysis does not attempt to build a detailed structural model and instead provides a simple and robust mechanism that captures the economics of the situation but is more tractable than a detailed structural model would be. Our model of consensus is more appropriate for a corporate board or other committee than the Nash bargaining solution would be, since the Nash bargaining solution is predicated on the assumption that unanimity is required so that the solution can only improve on a given disagreement point. In a corporate board or other committee with majority voting, the outcome must do well by majorities, even if the outcome is very undesirable for some minority members.
First, we show that consensus always exists and the consensus is unique except in a degenerate case. (It is also easy to modify the definition of consensus-using a measurable selection-to be unique all the time, for example, by selecting the midpoint of any interval of solutions.) Theorem 2. (Existence and Uniqueness) Given any t 1 , ... t N , there exists a consensus defined in Definition 1. Provided not all the t 1 , ... t N are collinear, consensus is unique.
Proof. By Theorem 1, consensus minimizes the objective (6). Consensus exists because the objective in (6) is continuous and dominated outside a compact set. If the t n 's are not collinear, the objective in (6) is strictly convex, which implies uniqueness. The detailed proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 3. (Pareto Optimality) If utilities are concave, differentiable, and have a unique maximum (ideal) or no maximum, then a consensus defined in Definition 1 is Pareto optimal. In particular, with a target t n , the ideal is unique and consensus is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let a * be the consensus. Note that, given the quadratic utility functions (1), we have (t n − a) = u If for some n, u ′ n (a * ) = z n = 0, then a * is the unique maximum of u n : any a = a * , u n (a) < u n (a * ). Therefore, a * is Pareto optimal. If, on the other hand, u ′ n (a * ) = 0 for all n, consider the following social welfare function,
Because utilities u n (a) are concave, W (a) is also concave. Therefore, actions that satisfy the first-order condition W ′ (a) = 0 are Pareto optimal. According to Definition 1, a * satisfies (4), which is equivalent to W ′ (a * ) = 0.
If a group of directors has the same target and more total bargaining power than the rest of the board, then their target is the consensus. Proof. The majority at t can have z n 's offsetting all the other z n 's in the characterization in Theorem 1. The detailed proof is in the Appendix.
The following result shows that when targets are collinear, a version of the median voter result holds. 
In the theorem, the weighted median voter's target is not unique if it is possible to strictly separate two groups with equal total weight that prefer to move in opposite directions. For example, consensus is never unique if there is an even number of directors with equal weights and distinct collinear targets. In these cases, every action in the closed interval between the two groups is a consensus.
The following theorem generalizes the result of Lemma 1, which offers a bound on an extreme director's impact on the consensus.
Theorem 6. (Extreme Director) Consider a board with N > 2 directors with targets t 1 , ..., t N and same bargaining power b n = 1 for all n. Suppose that for all i, j < N − 1, t i − t j ≤ K and let a * be the consensus. Then,
is the distance from a * to a compact set H, H = hull(t 1 , ..., t N −1 ), and hull denotes the convex hull.
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We devote the rest of the section to the result that while directors have utility functions that are separable across actions,
where a = (a 1 , ..., a M ) and t n = (t n1 , ..., t nM ), consensus is not separable on the actions. This result is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3. (Action Separability) Consider a board with 4 directors with no uncertainly about their ideals. Let their ideals (same as targets) be: t 1 = (−1, 0), t 2 = (2, 0), t 3 = (0, −1), and t 4 = (1, h). All directors have the same bargaining power b n = 1. The consensus is given by
for −2 ≥ h, as can be verified by checking the first-order conditions given by Theorem 1.
Although directors' preferences are separable across actions and changing h affects only one director's preferences for action a 2 , the consensus action a * 1 changes, and not even in a monotone way. However, this is reasonable, and there is a simple explanation: when either h ≫ 0 or h ≪ 0, director 4's strong preferences for a 2 imply that the director focuses political capital on a 2 . Therefore, director 4's preference to move a * 1 to the right has little impact when |h| is large and large impact when |h| is small.
Conclusion
We have developed a simple model of board decision-making in the presence of diverse directors. Our new solution concept, consensus, has two particularly appealing characteristics: first, it is consistent with a recourse to a majority voting in case of disagreement, and second, it allows directors with extreme preferences to have only a limited influence on the board's action.
We apply our model to analyze the influence of independent and grey directors on the board's decisions. Most importantly, we show that a grey director who has important information may be more valuable to the firm than an independent and uninformed director, especially if the board is large and not too diverse. Our model can also be applied to study the impact on boards' decisions of penalties such as those imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. We show that strict penalties may be undesirable because it is difficult to access the quality of the board's decisions ex-post.
We have touched on only a few of the issues involved in board composition. For example, we have not considered the incentives for information sharing, costly effort, and delegation. While these issues are investigated in Harris and Raviv (2004) and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) in models with a one-dimensional action space, it may be interesting to combine our approaches to analyze how the results change when directors' goals differ on different dimensions (for different actions). Another interesting extension would allow for side payments between directors.
17 It may be particularly applicable for analyzing to what extent side payments disguised as businessrelated transfers can induce directors who have a business relationship with the firm to vote with the firm's management. This problem is probably most severe when the board member also consults for the firm. We conjecture that this would be a bigger problem for a consultant who is paid directly than for a supplier who benefits indirectly.
In this paper, we have also omitted such important issues as directors' compensation and the need for having various types of expertise on the board. While there is little theoretical work on these issues, empirical analysis of some of these aspects can be found for example in Adams and Ferreira (2005) , Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) , and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) , and it would be nice to have a better theoretical understanding as well.
Proof. For any two actions a 1 and a 2 , (26)
Function f (a) is strictly convex if and only if (26) is a strict inequality for every a 1 and a 2 . Notice that (26) holds with equality if and only if (t n − a 1 ) and (t n − a 2 ) are collinear for all n. Collinearity of (t n − a 1 ) and (t n − a 2 ) implies that
Rearranging, find that t n is a weighted average of a 1 and a 2 :
for all n. Hence, collinearity of (t n −a 1 ) and (t n −a 2 ) implies that t 1 , ..., t N are collinear. Therefore, (26) is a strict inequality if t 1 , ..., t N are not collinear.
Proof of Theorem 1: Characterization
Proof. According to Lemma 5, f (a) is convex. Therefore, the action a * minimizes f (a) if and only if it satisfies the first-order condition. Because b n e n (a) is the subgradient correspondence for f (a) (as we show below), the first-order condition is given by (4).
The subgradient correspondence for f (a) can be derived as follows. Let g n (a) = t n − a . If a = t n , then the gradient of g n (a) at a is
If a = t n , then ε ∈ dg(a) if and only if
The above holds if and only if ε ≤ 1, or in other words, if and only if ε ∈ e(a). Hence, for any a, e(a) is the subgradient correspondence for g(a) = t n − a . Therefore, b n e n (a) is the subgradient correspondence for f (a).
Proof of Theorem 2: Existence and Uniqueness
Proof. Let S denote the ball in the action space that is centered at zero and has a radius of ( 2 B n b n t n ), where B = n b n ; therefore S ≡ {a ∈ ℜ M : a ≤ 2 B n b n t n }. Because f (a) is continuous, there exists an action a * that minimizes f (a) on the set S, a * = argmin a∈B f (a). To prove existence, it remains to show that a * is a global minimum of f (a).
Because a * minimizes f (a) on set S, it in particular implies that
For the actions a outside ball S, a / ∈ S,
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, and the second follows because a / ∈ S implies a > 2 B N k=1 t k . Combining (27) and (28) obtains that f (a * ) < f (a) for all a. In other words, a * is a global minimum.
From Lemma 5, the function f (a) is strictly convex when not all t 1 , ..., t N are collinear, and thus has a unique minimum. Therefore, the solution to (6) is unique if not all t 1 ,...,t n are collinear.
Proof of Theorem 4: Majority Rule
Proof.
Define vectors z n for n = 1, ..., N as follows:
These vectors z n satisfy (4). Therefore, from Theorem 1, t solves problem (6). From Theorem 2, the consensus is unique when not all t 1 , ..., t N are collinear.
To prove the theorem, it remains to show that when all t 1 , ..., t N are collinear, the consensus is unique when B 0 > B 1 . Indeed, for any action a = t, let z n ∈ e n (a) and observe that Therefore, from Theorem 1, a does not solve problem (6).
Proof of Theorem 5: Median Voter
Proof. We show first that any consensus a is collinear with t 1 , ..., t N : a = a 0 + β(a 1 − a 0 ). Suppose that, to the contrary, a = a 0 + β(a 1 − a 0 ) + x is a consensus, where x is a non-zero vector, orthogonal to (a 1 −a 0 ): x ′ (a 1 −a 0 ) = 0. Letâ = a 0 + β(a 1 − a 0 ). Then, for any n, t n − a = a 0 + ρ n (a 1 − a 0 ) − a 0 − β(a 1 − a 0 ) − x = (ρ n − β)(a 1 − a 0 ) − x > (ρ n − β)(a 1 − a 0 ) = t n −â , .
Therefore, moving from a toâ reduces every term in the objective of (6), contradicting the assumption that a is a consensus.
Consider a = a 0 +β(a 1 −a 0 ). Let N l be be the number of ρ n 's that are strictly less than β, let N g be the number of ρ n 's that are strictly greater than β, and let N e be the number of ρ n 's that equal β. Also, let b l = Rearranging the above, obtain that the claimed bound (24) on the distance holds.
Proof of Lemma 1: (Extreme Director)
We first look at the original directors' consensus (before the new director joins). Then, their targets t n are given by (7) because λ is unknown. By Theorem 1, a * 0 =ȳ is the consensus for the original N = N 0 directors because, taking z n = (t n − a * 0 )/ t n − a Note that, by construction, z n ∈ e n (a * 0 ), where e n (a) is defined in (5).
We next look at the board of directors after the new director joins. Then, the targets t n of the original directors are given by (8) because they know λ. Let a * =ȳλ + (h 0 , 0, 0), where h 0 is defined in the statement of the lemma. We want to apply Theorem 1 to show that a * is the consensus for the N = N 0 +1 directors. We take t n −ȳλ t n −ȳλ .
which is zero because the second term in the above expression is zero from a derivation similar to (30) and the first and the third term cancel from the definition of z N 0 +1 . By construction, z n ∈ e n (a * ) for n ≤ N 0 , as we now Noting that cos(θ) 2 + (sin(θ)) 2 = 1 and rearranging, obtain
The sufficient condition (17) then follows from cos(θ) ≤ 1
